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ABSTRACT 
Defense acquisition in the Republic of South Africa is performed by the defense 
procurement agency called the Armament Corporation of South Africa (Armscor). The 
agency is faced with the challenge to acquire products and services effectively and 
efficiently and within a limited budget. One of the elements that contribute to increased 
efficiency in procurement is the reduction of contract risk. The agency's regulations 
presently allow the use of fixed-price contracts that limits its capability to mitigate risks 
especially in the procurement of specialized and complex military products. The study is 
organized in the following manner. Firstly, it presents structures; policies and regulations 
that govern contract types. Secondly, it reviews contract types used by the U.S. Federal 
agencies and other countries. Thirdly, it analyses Armscor's contracting procedures 
related to contract types. Lastly, the study recommends contract types that are suitable for 
the South African defense agency and changes that should be adopted before they can be 
incorporated. The research recommends a contract type model for Armscor. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       GENERAL 
The   Armaments   Corporation  of South  Africa  (Armscor)   is  the  national 
procurement agency overseen by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of South 
Africa. It was established to meet South Africa's needs for the procurement of armaments 
and related products and services. [Ref. 1] In 1962, the former South African 
Government decided to expand the defense related industries in the face of increasing 
international isolation. This isolation was caused by apartheid and growing resistance 
domestically and in the region. At that time, armaments production was largely in the 
hands of private industry. 
By 1964, the first step taken was the formation of a statutory body or the 
Armaments Production Board, which was responsible for procurement for the then South 
African Defense Force (SADF) and for establishing and managing public sector defense- 
related industries. The Board was also tasked with the coordination of arms production in 
the private sector, and by 1966 nearly one thousand private sector firms were involved in 
various aspects of domestic arms production. 
In 1968, the Armaments Production Board was renamed the Armaments Board 
and tasked with procuring armaments for the SADF, as well as with ensuring the optimal 
utilization of the private sector. In the same year, the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa established the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of 
South Africa (Armscor) [Ref. 1] with the mandate to foster and develop South Africa's 
domestic defense industry and to supervise the manufacture of armaments. During the 
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next few years, Armscor took over various private sector companies and established a 
number of new production, and research and development facilities. 
The main reason for creating Armscor was fundamentally strategic in nature 
primarily due to the critical concerns of the South African Government at that time. In 
1982, Armscor began to market South African products abroad, proving that many were 
unique while providing superior solutions for a wide range of needs. However, by 1989, 
tension in South Africa had declined, and demand for arms had decreased sharply. As a 
result, Armscor's activities needed to be reorganized. 
The status quo changed on 1 April 1992 when the South African Government 
formed a state owned corporation, called Denel Pty (Ltd), operating under the 
Department of Public Enterprise. [Ref. 2] Denel took over the responsibilities of 
manufacturing and selling arms. Armscor retained the acquisition responsibilities. 
Armscor became responsible for promoting and facilitating the marketing activities of the 
wider South African defense industry and market's surplus equipment on behalf of the 
South African National Defense Force (SANDF). [Ref. 2] 
The changes in 1994 in South Africa's regional standing was marked by its 
admission to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC is a twelve- 
member organization (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) whose aim is to 
promote regional cooperation in economic development and security affairs. [Ref. 2] 
The defense budget of South Africa is declining much faster than that of its 
neighbors; this decline has affected the procurement budget. The effect of this reduction 
causes concern about the future security arrangements in the region. A further concern is 
the survivability of the defense industry. 
This research attempts to review the defense contracting process used by the 
South African defense agency Armscor. The research intends to find ways for the defense 
industry to continue supplying products and services within the new limited budget. The 
researcher identified contract types selection as an element of risk mitigation for the 
South African Government and the contractors ultimately reducing unnecessary costs to 
the Government. Armscor regulations only promote the use of fixed-priced type 
contracts, while international literature recommends the use of many other contract types 
depending on how well the Government can define its requirements. The literature also 
recommends the use of fixed-prices when the risk involved is minimal or can be 
predicted with an acceptable degree of certainty. The research identifies problems 
experienced when contracting on a fixed-priced type contract where financial risk is 
involved, in long-term projects or in research and development projects. The alternative 
to fixed-price contracts is cost-reimbursement contracts. 
B.        RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research are to streamline all activities required to procure 
products and services for the Government of South Africa in an efficient and effective 
manner. Additionally this research compares the Armscor procurement system with the 
U.S. procurement system. The U.S. system consists of the U.S. Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), the U.S. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) and other supplementary regulations. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Given Armscor's approach to evaluate contract types, the following primary 
research question was developed for this thesis: 
What are the critical issues and problems involved in the contracts used by 
Armscor and how might the contracting process be enhanced through a broader use of 
contract types? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
In support of this primary research question the following subsidiary questions are 
appropriate: 
• What is the current state of the Armscor contracting system concerning 
contract types? 
• What are the major categories of systems, goods and services that 
Armscor processes and what implications do these categories have for 
contract types? 
• What are the current problems and issues that limit Armscor's 
procurement capability and the potential use of alternative contract types? 
• What types of contracts might be suitable for Armscor? 
• What changes can be incorporated into current Armscor regulations 
governing contract types? 
• What model structure of contract types should Armscor utilize? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
In order to answer the primary and secondary questions, the researcher conducted 
a comprehensive search of available literature dealing with contract risk allocation, 
incentives and contractor motivation concerning contract types selection. Additionally, 
the researcher interviewed various personnel in the policy sections of the South African 
Department of Defense (SA DoD), Armscor officials and the Armscor Programme 
Managers1 (APMs) as well as DoD Program Officers2 (POs). Interview questions are 
contained in Appendix A. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
The primary assumption is that the reader is familiar with the fundamental 
processes of Government contracting. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
This research is organized in the following manner: Chapter I contains the 
introduction, research objectives, questions to be analyzed, methodology and 
assumptions. Chapter II presents the defense structure, the background information, the 
defense budget, the procurement system and the definition of contract types and 
regulations used by Armscor. Chapter HI presents generic contract types used by the U.S. 
Federal Government and other countries. Chapter IV presents and analyses the problems 
caused by using fixed-price contracts only. Chapter V provides conclusions derived from 
the research and proposes recommendations. 
1 An Armscor Programme Manager is a civilian Armscor employee who is authorized to enter into a contract with 
the industry. This person is authorized to make contract determination and findings, administer and terminate contracts. 
The APM also manages specific acquisition programs, coordinates defense industry contractors and consultants. The 
APM is responsible for the overall procurement of the contract 
2 A Project Officer is an appointed member of S.A. DoD, usually military, who is representing the Departmental 
Acquisition and Procurement Division on a project team. The PO is responsible for the user requirements and project 
funding. 
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II.     PRESENTATION OF REGULATIONS AND ISSUES 
ASSOCIATED WITH CONTRACT TYPES USED BY ARMSCOR 
A. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT 
The world regards South Africa as one of the most outstanding examples today of 
how severe political, racial and ethnic differences can be resolved through negotiation 
and compromise. This is underscored by the crucial role South Africa plays in the 
political stability of southern and central Africa. It achieved independence in 1994 and is 
led by a President who is also the Commander in Chief of the South African National 
Defense Force (SANDF). The President presides over Government Ministries that 
include the Ministry of Defense. 
B. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
The Minister of Defense is accountable to the Parliament and the Cabinet leads 
the South African Ministry of Defense. The Parliament has legislative powers over the 
defense budget and reviews the President's decision to deploy the South African National 
Defense Force (SANDF) in critical missions. 
Article 228(3) of the South African interim constitution made provisions for the 
formation of the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense (JPSCD). The 
powers of the committee are to investigate and make recommendations regarding the 
defense budget, functions, armaments, policy and morale. The committee evaluates the 
state of preparedness of the SANDF and also performs such functions as parliamentary 
supervision of the force as prescribed by law. [Ref. 5] 
The Minister of Defense directs and controls the performance of the defense 
functions through the statutory Council on Defense, while the Chief of the SANDF and 
the Secretary of Defense serve as co-chairmen of the Defense Staff Council. The Defense 
Staff Council advises the Minister on defense matters. [Ref. 5] 
The constitution mandates that the Chief of the SANDF executes military 
command of the armed forces. This command is executed under the direction of the 
Minister of Defense in times of peace and under the President during a state of national 
defense. The Secretary for Defense manages the Defense Secretariat and is the 
accountable officer of the South African DoD. The Secretary for Defense is the principal 
advisor to the Minister on defense policy and matters that can be investigated by the 
JPSCD. 
C.        PROCUREMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
The South African DoD is responsible for selecting and approving acquisition 
programs at three different levels. The highest program approval level is called the 
Armament Acquisition Council (AAC) that approves cardinal projects. The Minister of 
Defense is the chairman of the Council and is charged with identifying major 
procurement programs and presenting them to the Cabinet and Parliament for approval. 
At this level, the final selection of the equipment and supplier, as well as any monetary 
commitments for strategically important and large projects, is undertaken. 
The middle level of approval is called the Armament Acquisition Steering Board 
(AASB) chaired by the Secretary for Defense. This Board approves smaller projects and 
screens the larger projects. 
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The lowest level of approval is the Armament Acquisition Control Board 
(AACB), which is chaired by the Chief of Acquisition within the Defense Secretariat. 
This board screens all projects and other routine programs in terms of requirements and 
amendments. [Ref. 6] 
D.       THE PROCUREMENT AGENCY 
Legislation recognizes Armscor as the Government armament procurement 
agency under the direct control of the Minister of Defense. [Ref. 5] DoD regards Armscor 
as its procurement agency, responsible for program management and contracting. The 
Departmental Acquisition and Procurement Division (DAPD) is that part of the DoD 
responsible for the execution of armament acquisition programs. [Ref. 6] According to 
DoD policy on acquisition, DAPD is a single nodal point between Armscor and the DoD. 
[Ref. 6] 
Legislation defines the primary functions of the agency as acquiring defense 
products and services, mainly for the SANDF, and the development of the technologies 
required for future weapon systems. Armscor is a separate entity that has its own Board 
of Directors. [Ref. 4] The Minister of Defense appoints the chairman of the agency. 
While both the Chief of the SANDF and the Secretary of Defense serve on the Armscor 
Board of Directors. The main function of the Board is to broadly oversee management in 
terms of strategic imperatives and budget. Armscor is regarded as the "other leg"3 of the 
Ministry of Defense and is responsible to the Minister. Figure 1. presents the structure of 
3
 The other leg of the Minister of Defense is an expression that was used by the Ministry of Defense 
Spokesperson in 1982 and has been adopted by Armscor since then. 
the South African Ministry of Defense as interpreted by Armscor and according to 
legislation. 




Secretary for Defense Chief of the SANDF 
Staff Divisions 
Chairman of Armscor 
Staff Divisions Armscor Board of Directors 
SANDF Units Armscor Corporation (Ltd) 
Figure 1. The South African Ministry of Defense. 
Source: Developed by the researcher. 
Armscor and the DoD (Defense Secretariat and the South African National 
Defense Force) share equal status in the Defense Review. Attendants of this review are 
the Chiefs of the SANDF staff for operations, logistics and finance, the Chairman of 
Armscor, the Armscor Chief Executive Officer and a representative from the industry 
defense. The Defense Review was established to ensure participation of the defense 
community4 in the planning process. Industry is represented through the South African 
4
 The defense community refers to the South African DoD, Armscor and the Defense related industry. 
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Aerospace, Maritime and Defense industries association (AMD). They represent about 
95% of the country's total defense industry. [Ref. 8] 
E.       DEFENSE BUDGET 
The South African defense budget grew ten times nominally between 1975 and 
1989, from Rl billion to R9.4 billion (R - South African Rands) in constant dollar value; 
however, the increase was from US $3 billion per year in the early 1980s to US $3.43 
billion per year in 1988 prices. Defense spending averaged 16.4 percent of the 
Government budget in the 1980s. According to a 1989 survey by the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, South Africa ranked 13th in total military 
expenditures, 44th in the military percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
63rd in military spending [Ref.7]. The ranking come from a comparison of 144 countries. 
In 1998, the total South African defense spending was reduced to less than 3% of 
the GDP. The defense contractors have suffered losses as a result of the reduction in the 
defense budget. The largest defense contractor Denel lost US $69 million in 1998. [Ref.7] 
Table 1 presents the South African Defense spending when compared as a percentage of 
GDP with its neighboring states. 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Botswana 3.6% 3.1% 2.6% 2.9% 3.5% 
Mozambique 8.8% 3.9% 3.6% 3.7% (4.2%) 
Zimbabwe 3.3% 3.9% 3.2% 3.4% 2.6% 
Namibia 1.8% 2% 2.1% 2.5% 2.6% 
South Africa 2.9% 2.5% 2.1% 1.9% 1.6% 
Swaziland 2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2 2.4% 
Lesotho 2.8% 2.8% 2.6% 2.9% 3.2% 
Table 1. Defense Budget Comparison of countries Neighboring South Africa. 
From: Sipri Year Book 2000, Military Expenditure Database. 
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F. DEFENSE REVIEW 
The Defense Review is provided by the White Paper on Defense. It elaborates the 
defense policy framework "through a comprehensive long range planning on matters 
such as posture, doctrine, force design, force level, logistic support, armament, equipment 
human resource and funding." [Ref. 3 ] 
The Defense Review is comprised of various specialty subcommittees. The main 
body is the Work Group on Defense, consisting of members of the Parliament, Defense 
Secretariat, the SANDF, Armscor and the Defense Industry. 
The responsibility of the Defense Review is to assess various possible threats and 
missions making assumptions about the "warning time" or lead-time during which the 
SANDF can make preparations. The Review's key function is making procurement 
recommendations to the Minister of Defense along with assessing user requirements of 
the SANDF in its quarterly meetings. Armscor does not drive the weapons decisions; 
SANDF does this. The Agency's purpose is to convert the user requirements into 
concrete technical specifications and then to acquire them from industry. 
G. PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
The Armscor procurement process distinguishes three types of projects: cardinal 
projects, critical and routine. [Ref. 10] Cardinal projects are those that require interaction 
with international treaties, tendencies and domestic politics. These projects may be of 
high strategic nature, high cost and may involve high risk. Critical projects are for urgent 
requirements; nonetheless, some critical projects may also be classified as cardinal. 
Routine projects are usually non-cardinal and are for commercial products and services. 
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Armscor procures these products and services from the domestic industry or foreign 
contractors. 
The agency's procurement process begins with the generation of requirements by 
the DoD. As soon as Armscor receives the requirements, it assigns the Armscor 
Programme Manager (APM). The APM registers and compiles the requirements into the 
Armscor financial system and sends the request for proposal to prospective offerors. If 
there is only one source, the APM may begin pre-award discussions even before the 
proposals are received. No discussions are allowed with offerors when procuring 
commercial products. All questions and clarification are channeled through the Armscor 
Procurement Division. The Armscor procurement process is illustrated in Figure 2. 
When proposals are received they are subject to internal inspection before they 
are given to the APM. Depending on the type of project, the proposals may be assessed 
by an evaluation committee. The APM evaluates projects of lower value. 
After making the selection, the Armscor administration officer requests financial 
authority from the DoD system for the value of the selected proposal. The APM compiles 
a submission that is approved by the relevant authority as shown in Figure 3. The 
submission consists of the solicitation information, offer receipt, the selection procedure 
and criteria, justification for the selected offers and all other related information. The 
APM submits the latter information to the team leader. 
The team leader is one level higher than the APM. The team leader verifies, signs 
the submission and sends it to the respective level of approval. The contract is awarded to 
the responsible and responsive offeror after the committee approves the submission. 
13 
Armscor Internal Approval 




Contract Closure and 
Delivery 
Figure 2. Armscor Procurement Process. 
Source: Developed by the researcher. 
14 
The Selection Team 
Evaluatse Proposals 
The Ann in Officer 
Request! Financial 
Authority from the Pop 
APM Compile! Subraiaiion 
Team Leider reviewi and 
signs the subm ission 








Approved by the 
Senior Manager 
* 
JT   No 
Contract Value < R2M 




Contract Value < R5M 
Approved by the 
Arm scor Acquisition 
Committee 
1   No 
Approved by the 
Armscor Board of 
DirectoTi 
Contracts above RSM 
Figure 3.        Armscor Internal Approval Process. 
Source: Developed by the researcher. 
H.       KIND OF CONTRACTS 
Armscor projects are further classified into complex and non-complex. Complex 
projects may have to go through the full acquisition process. The agency acquisition 
process includes the following phases: concept, design, development, production, 
commissioning and operations. Separate projects may also be placed for each phase. 
Non-complex projects usually have detailed specifications but may be distinguished 
according to the total expenditure. 
Armscor acquires a large percentage of complex weapon systems from foreign 
sources. The Government of South Africa requires all international offerors to comply 
with an industrial participation program. This program requires the offerors to invest in 
15 
South Africa or subcontract with the domestic industry for supply of sub-systems [Ref. 
12]. 
I. ARMSCOR CONTRACT TYPES 
The Armscor regulations do not address contract types. It addresses price 
adjustment. There is a relationship between price adjustment and contract type, since the 
objective is to negotiate a contract type and price that will result in reasonable contractor 
risk and provide the contractor with incentives for efficiency. This research studies the 
Armscor process of negotiating prices as it relates to various international principles. 
Armscor distinguishes between two types of arrangements, "fixed-price" and "not fixed- 
price". 
1. Fixed-Price Contract 
Fixed-price means the price cannot be changed and is not subject to adjustment. 
[Ref. 13] Armscor uses the term "fixed-price' contracts for all contracts including the 
firm-fixed-price. Generally, fixed-price contracts are suitable for acquiring commercial 
items. Thus, when there is adequate price competition (multi-source contracting), 
reasonableness is determined based on previous or similar purchases. Fixed-price 
contracts are used when the APM can determine performance uncertainties and write a 
concrete detailed specification. Armscor recommends fixed-price contracts when the 
budget is insufficient to place a long-term contract and the APM can persuade the 
contractor to perform more and commit to a fixed-price and firm delivery. 
2. Price is not Fixed Subject to the Rate of Exchange 
This is a variant of the firm-fixed-price contract that is subject to the rate of 
exchange. The Armscor contracting procedure requires all offerers to detail the foreign 
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content of the products. The cost of foreign products is subject to the currency rate of 
exchange (ROE) and the Government will pay the difference when there is currency 
fluctuation. 
This arrangement is used to reimburse contractors for the increase in costs caused 
by the rate of exchange fluctuation. For example the exchange rate between the South 
African Rand and the U.S. dollar has almost doubled since 1995. Armscor requires the 
contractor to submit the relevant invoices from its foreign supplier, accompanied by 
supporting documentation from the bankers as to when the foreign exchange was paid 
and the rate of exchange at which payment was affected in order to verify the particulars. 
[Ref. 11] 
In all cases where products bought have to be imported, the contractor is not 
entitled to benefit and profit from any change in the rate of exchange of the currencies 
involved. Similarly, the contractor is not expected to bear any loss caused by a change in 
the rate of exchange, unless such loss is incurred as a result of the contractor's negligence 
or non-compliance with the provisions set out hereunder. [Ref. 12] 
3.        Price is not Fixed Subject to Escalation 
This type of contract allows economic price adjustment by using a formula. This 
contract type resembles the fixed-price-economic price adjustment that is used by U.S. 
Federal procurement agencies. The description of the price adjustment is illustrated by 
the following formula: 
My-z         Ly-z             Ohy-z 
PI =Po(a + b  +c  +d ) Formula 1 
Mx Lx Ohx 
Where: 
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Po    = contract price before adjustment (minus foreign content and / or 
advanced payment) 
PI    = contract price after adjustment 
M    = direct material index as published by for month x and y 
L     = direct labor index as published for month x and y 
Oh   = indirect cost index, including indirect material, indirect labor and 
other overhead costs 
The contractor is allowed to use more than one index for the applicable cost 
categories if no suitable single index representative of the direct material, direct labor or 
indirect costs exist. 
a   = percentage of Po not subject to cost contract price adjustment 
b   = percentage of Po representing direct materials 
c   = percentage of Po representing direct labor 
d   = percentage of Po representing indirect costs 
x  = base date of indexes, to be taken on the date the quotation is prepared 
y   = contractual or actual date of delivery, whichever is the earliest 
z = period in months prior to contractual delivery date in which the 
contractor planned the respective costs to be occurred [Ref. 12] 
Of note, Armscor only incorporates independent indices into its price 
arrangements that contractors cannot directly or indirectly influence or control. 
Armscor uses this type of arrangement when the cost of the contract is Rl 00,000 
($13,000) and above and/or the delivery period is over six months. It is also applied when 
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the Armscor contractor cannot estimate the contract price with certainty and when 
Armscor acquires major defense systems that are deliverable in more than one year. 
J.        CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a general description of the regulations and procedures 
followed by the Republic of South Africa. It presents all stakeholders in the defense 
procurement and their responsibilities. The chapter also presents contract types used by 
Armscor. 
The next chapter will present contract types used internationally. Special focus is 
placed on the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation System and contract types utilized by 
the U.S. Department of Defense. 
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in.    GENERIC CONTRACT TYPES USED BY THE U.S. FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the U.S. Federal Acquisition System, generic contract 
types used by the U.S. Federal agencies and the U.S. DoD. 
B. THE U.S. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SYSTEM 
Defense procurement in the United States (U.S.) is done under the auspices of the 
Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA) of 1949. This Act has been amended several 
times since then. One significant amendment was done in 1984 with the introduction of 
the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) [Ref. 14]. Other amendments to the Act were 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 
1996 [Ref. 14]. The U.S. Congress provides a single regulation that covers all U.S. 
Government agencies called the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which is written 
by the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council. The Council consists of the 
Administrator of Federal Procurement Policy, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Administrator of National Aeronautic and Space Administration, and the Administrator 
of the General Services Administration. All of the major agencies with procurement 
authority issue supplementary regulations to assist with implementation of the FAR. 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issues a supplement to this regulation 
called the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The FAR and 
all its supplements are known as the Federal Acquisition System (FAR System) 
developed under the Office of Procurement Policy (OFPP) Act of 1974. The predecessor 
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regulation included the Defense Acquisition Regulation (previously developed under the 
authority of the ASPA), and the Federal Procurement Regulation, which are based on the 
Federal Property Regulations and Administrative Services Act of 1949. The FAR System 
was established for the codification and certification of uniform policies and procedures 
for acquisition by all executive agencies. [Ref. 14] 
The FAR defines contract types authorized for use by the U.S. Government and 
classifies them into two basic types, fixed-price and cost-reimbursement. The term 
"contract type" refers to the method provided in the contract for compensating the 
contractor for supplies and services provided to the Government. [Ref. 14] The FAR also 
provides eleven factors that need to be considered in selecting the appropriate contract 
type. [Ref. 15] 
C.        CONTRACT TYPE SELECTION FACTORS 
Selecting the proper contract type requires sound judgment. The objective is to 
negotiate a contract type that fairly allocates performance risk between the contractor and 
the Government while incentivizing the contractor to perform effectively and 
economically. In order to achieve the latter, the following factors need to be considered 
[Ref. 14]. 
1.        Acquisition History 
Contractor risk usually decreases as the requirement is repetitively acquired. Also, 
product descriptions or description of services to be performed can be defined more 
clearly. 
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2. Price Competition 
A procurement action should be competed whenever possible. Effective 
competition normally facilitates reasonable prices, especially if a fixed-price contract can 
be used. 
3. Price Analysis 
Price analysis, with and without competition, is a process by which the 
contracting officer analyses proposed prices to determine reasonableness. It includes 
comparing prices with historical prices, market prices and other competitive quotes. 
4. Cost Analysis 
Cost estimates provide the offeror and the Government with the basis for 
negotiating a contract-pricing arrangement in the absence of price competition. Cost 
analysis involves the evaluation of the offerer's cost and pricing data. These data are 
analyzed to determine the reasonableness, allowability and allocability of costs and the 
basis of cost estimates. 
5. Type and Complexity of the Requirement 
The contracting officer assesses the degree of risk assumed by both the offeror 
and the Government. Unique, unstable and complex Government requirements usually 
result in greater risk assumption by the Government. 
6. Urgency of the Requirement 
If urgency is a factor, the contracting officer may choose to give the contractor 
some incentives to meet the desired delivery schedule or assume a greater proportion of 
the cost risk. 
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7. Period of Performance or Length of Production Run 
Some contracts extend over a long period of time and may require economic price 
adjustment. This may be applicable in times of economic uncertainty. 
8. Contractor's Technical Capability and Financial Responsibility 
The Government must establish the offeror's performance capability and financial 
health prior to contract award. 
9. Adequacy of the Contractor's Accounting System 
Before the Government contracts using contract types other than fixed-price- 
type, the contracting officer should ensure that the contractor's accounting system will 
permit timely development of all necessary cost data in a form required by the proposed 
contract type. 
10. Concurrent Contracts 
If the offeror holds other Government and/or commercial contracts, the 
contracting officer must determine what impact these contracts will have on the proposed 
contract. 
11. Extent and Nature of Proposed Subcontracting 
The contracting officer should assess subcontracting by the prime contractor when 
selecting the appropriate contract type that reflects the actual risk. 
D.        TYPES OF CONTRACTS 
The two main contract types are the fixed-price and the cost-reimbursement 
contracts. Fixed-price contracts involve substantial risk for the contractor while cost- 
reimbursement contracts place very little risk on the contractor [Ref. 16]. Fixed-price 
contracts are appropriate for products and services that are objectively defined in the 
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solicitation and for which the risk of performance is manageable. For such acquisitions, 
performance-based statements of work, measurable performance standards and 
surveillance plans are ideally suited. The contractor aims to find improved methods of 
performance in order to increase its profits. In comparison, cost-reimbursement contracts 
are appropriate for products and services that are only defined in general terms or for 
which the risk of performance is not reasonably manageable. 
Fixed-price contracts include Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts, fixed-price 
contracts with economic price adjustment (FPE), fixed-price contracts with prospective 
price redetermination (FPRP), fixed-price contracts with retroactive price redetermination 
(FPRR) and firm-fixed-price, level-of-effort term contracts (FP-LOE), fixed-price 
incentive firm target (FPEF) contracts, fixed-price incentive successive targets (FPIS) and 
fixed-price-award fee (FPAF) contracts. 
Cost-reimbursement contracts include Cost-No-Fee (CNF), cost-sharing (CS), 
cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF), cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts (CPIF), cost-plus-award-fee 
(CPAF) and the award term (AT) contracts. Award term contracts are a derivative of the 
Award fee contracts used in performance based contracting. 
Fixed rate contracts exhibit both fixed-price and cost-reimbursement 
characteristics and include the Time-and-Material (TM), the Labor Hour (LH), Definite- 
Quantity and Indefinite Quantity Contracts. 
Cost-reimbursement contracts are utilized when the buyer will assume greater risk 
of performance, while fixed-price contracts represent the contractor's assumption of risk. 
Figure 4. below illustrates the risk continuum for contract types. 
25 
Minimum cost risk to 
Government 
Maximum cost risk to 
Contractor 






























Maximum cost risk to 
Government 
Minimum cost risk to 
Contractor 
Figure 4. Contract Type Risk Continuum. 
Source: Designed by the researcher 
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1.        Fixed-Price Contracts 
Under a fixed-price contract, the contractor agrees to provide a product or 
accomplish specific work for a pre-set price. The contractor should, therefore, be very 
careful in pricing such work. The contractor should take into account potential cost 
increases caused by inflation, material shortages, or difficulties in meeting performance 
requirements, particularly if the contract contains options. Options give the Government 
the right to require the contractor to perform additional work at agreed to prices. 
a.        Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts 
The Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract is an agreement to pay a specified 
price for delivery of specific products and services. The FFP contract provides for a price 
that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experience in 
performing the contract. With this type, the price is firm for the duration of the contract 
and the only adjustments made are authorized changes. Under this type of contract, the 
contractor can receive the maximum profit and assume the maximum risk of profit or 
loss. The contractor also assumes the risk of unexpected costs, such as those that might 
result from inflation, material shortage, etc. [Ref. 16]. 
The FFP is the preferred contract type because of its minimal 
administrative burden on both parties and the maximum incentives for the contractor to 
control costs and perform effectively. The FFP contract also allows accurate monetary 
obligation. 
This type of contract is not recommended where costs cannot be estimated 
accurately because the contractor may include contingencies in its price proposal to cover 
the performance risk, thus raising the price of the contract. 
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FFP contracts are generally used when there is adequate competition, the 
costs of performance are reasonably predictable and when adequate, functional or 
detailed specifications are available. Such contracts are particularly suitable for standard 
or modified commercial items and previously purchased military items where past 
performance permits prediction of costs. An illustration of FFP contract is demonstrated 
in Figure 5 of Appendix B. 
b. Fixed-price with Economic Price Adjustment Contracts 
Fixed-price with economic price adjustment (FPE) contracts protects the 
Government and the contractor against wide fluctuations in labor or material costs when 
market conditions are unstable. This type of contract provides for adjustment of the 
contract price for increases or decreases from an agreed-upon level measured against 
published or established prices of specific items: specified costs of labor and material 
actually experienced during performance, specified labor or material cost standards or 
indexes, such as the producer price indexes. The contract is adjusted only if the price 
levels specified in the contract change. Frequently, the contract will contain a ceiling 
price beyond which the Government will not pay, no matter what the cost increases may 
be [Ref. 17]. Additionally, the contract may specify a minimum movement in the price to 
trigger a price adjustment. 
These types of contracts are used when there is serious doubt about the 
stability of market or labor conditions that could exist during an extended period of 
contract performance, and when any contingencies that would otherwise be included in 
the contract price are identified and covered separately in the contract. [Ref. 18] The FPE 
contract is illustrated in Figure 6 of Appendix B. 
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c. Fixed-Price with Price Redetermination Contracts 
There are two types of fixed-price with price redetermination contracts: 
the fixed-price with prospective price redetermination and the fixed-ceiling-price with 
retroactive price redetermination. 
(1) Fixed-Price with Prospective Price Redetermination 
Contract Under a Fixed-Price with Prospective Price Redetermination Contract (FPRP). 
The Government pays a fixed-price for goods or services, but the price is subject to 
revision at stated times during performance of the contract. At the time of 
redetermination, the contractor submits a proposal based on actual costs of performance 
and the estimated cost of any incomplete work. After a Government audit, the contractor 
negotiates a revised price, which could be higher or lower than the initial price but cannot 
exceed the ceiling price. 
A FPRP contract is used in the acquisition of products or services 
for which it is possible to negotiate a fair and reasonable Firm-Fixed-Price for an initial 
period, but not for subsequent periods of contract performance. The initial period is 
usually the longest period possible to negotiate a fair and reasonable firm-fixed-price. 
Each subsequent period should be at least 12 months. [Ref. 14] FPRP contract is 
illustrated in Appendix B. 
(2) Fixed-Ceiling-Price With Retroactive Price 
Redetermination Contract. A Fixed-ceiling-price with retroactive price redetermination 
(FPRR) contract provides for a ceiling price and retroactive redetermination after 
completion of the contract. [Ref. 14] Therefore the Government pays a fixed-price for 
goods or services, subject to a price ceiling, that is negotiated after the contract 
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performance. A FPRR is applied when a fair and reasonable price and firm-fixed-price 
cannot be negotiated for the initial period of performance, therefore rendering other types 
of contracts impracticable. In the U.S., the FPRR contract is restricted to R&D effort 
estimated to cost less than $100,000. [Ref. 20] Appendix B illustrates the FPRR contract. 
d.        Fixed-Price Level Of Effort Contracts 
Under a Fixed-Price Level of Effort (FFP-LOE), the contractor is required 
to provide a specified level of effort, over a stated period of time, for work that can only 
be stated in general terms with the Government paying the contractor a fixed amount. 
[Ref. 15] In this contract type the Government assumes all the risk for completion of 
performance. The financial risk to the contractor is minimal since payment is based on 
the level of effort and not on the results achieved. This contract type is appropriate for 
investigation or study in a specific R&D area. The product of the contract is usually a 
report showing the results achieved through application of the required level of effort. 
[Ref. 14] An example of the FFP-LOE is illustrated in Appendix B. 
Firm-Fixed-Price contracts and Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee contracts are the 
extremes of the contract compensation arrangements, since in either case the 
responsibility of cost falls primary on only one party. In between the two extremes are a 
number of contracts in which the responsibility of cost is shared between the contractor 
and the Government. These are called incentive type contracts. [Ref. 16] The 
Government applies incentives on contracts in an attempt to motivate the contractor to 
improve performance in cost, schedule or other stated parameters. The two basic types of 
incentive arrangements are the incentive fee contract and the award fee contract. The 
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incentive fee contract types consist of the Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI) contract and the 
Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee contract (CPIF). 
e.        Fixed-Price-Incentive Contracts 
The FPI contracts include two types: the Fixed-price Incentive Firm 
Target (FPIF) and the Fixed-Price Incentive Successive Targets (FPIS). 
(1) Fixed-Price-Incentive with Firm Target Contracts. The 
FPIF contracts allow the contract elements to be negotiated from the outset using a target 
cost, target profit, ceiling price and sharing formula. 
The FPIF contract is applied where the firm-fixed-price contract is 
not suitable. It is also used when assumptions of the degree of responsibility of cost by 
the contractor provides incentive for effective cost control. This contract type can be 
combined with the performance and the schedule incentives. A FPIF contract is 
appropriate when the parties negotiate, at the outset a firm target cost, target profit, and 
profit adjustment formula establishing a fair and reasonable incentive and ceiling that 
requires the contractor to assume an appropriate share of the risk. When the contractor 
assumes a considerable or major share of the cost responsibility under the adjustment 
formula, the target profit should reflect this responsibility. [Ref. 20] Figure 7 of Appendix 
B exhibits this type of contract. 
The price the Government pays is the sum of the negotiated cost 
and the final profit. The final profit is determined by comparing the final negotiated cost 
to target cost and adjusting target profit in accordance with the share ratio formula. The 
final price cannot exceed the ceiling price. 
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(2) Fixed-Price-Incentive With Successive Target Contracts. 
Fixed-Price-Incentive with Successive Target contracts specifies the following elements: 
initial target cost, initial target profit, initial target profit formula, ceiling price and target 
profit adjustment formula. At a given predetermined production point, the firm target cost 
is negotiated and the firm target profit is determined in accordance with the formula. 
After the latter adjustment, the parties may either negotiate a firm-fixed-price or a firm- 
fixed-price with firm target contract. 
A fixed-price incentive contract is similar to a redetermination 
contract. The difference is that a fixed-price incentive contract contains a target cost, a 
target profit, a price ceiling, and a formula by which the Government and contractor share 
any differences between target costs and actual final costs, as negotiated. The formula 
rewards the contractor with more profit if final costs are less than the target cost, and it 
takes profit away if final costs exceed the target. For example, a typical sharing 
arrangement would be one whereby the Government keeps 80 percent of the savings and 
the contractor retains the remaining 20 percent. Similarly, if final costs were higher than 
the target cost, the Government pays 80 percent of the excess costs, and the contractor 
has to bear 20 percent of the excess costs as a reduction of profit. An infinite variety of 
sharing arrangements is possible, however the contractor cannot be paid more than the 
ceiling price. [Ref. 14] Figure 8 of Appendix B illustrates the FPIS and the point of total 
assumption (PTA). The PTA is the point at which $1 more of incurred cost equals $1 
reduction in profit. It is the point at which the share formula converts the contract to a 
firm-fixed-price. 
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A FPIS contract is applied where the firm-fixed-price contract is 
not suitable. It is appropriate when the available cost and pricing data is not sufficient to 
permit the negotiation of a realistic firm target cost and profit before the award. A FPIS 
requires that sufficient information be available for parties to negotiate initial targets and 
a reasonable assurance that additional reliable information is available at an early point in 
the contract performance. This permits negotiation of either a firm-fixed-price or a firm 
target and a formula for establishing the final profit and price providing a fair and 
reasonable incentive. This additional information is not limited to experience under the 
contract, itself, but may be drawn from other contracts containing the same or similar 
items. [Ref. 10] 
/ Award Fee Contracts 
The interim type of incentive contracts, award fee and award term 
contracts, are based on performance of the contractor. These types of contracts give the 
contractor the freedom to utilize its talents and expertise in performing the job 
economically, efficiently, and effectively, using the latest techniques and innovations. 
This method of contracting is called Performance-Based Contracting 
(PBC). Generally, a PBC contracting arrangement fits well for function or performance 
specifications. The ability to use PBC with specifications based on essential physical 
characteristics often depends on the amount of freedom the contractor has in making 
meaningful choices versus the level of design details provided. 
Award fee contracts are used either with fixed-price, or cost- 
reimbursement contracts pricing arrangements. The two types of award fee contracts are 
Fixed-Price-Award-Fee (FPAF) and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts (CPAF). The award 
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fee contract represents a middle ground of the cost risk continuum; from a contractor's 
cost risk standpoint, it lies between fixed and cost-plus-fixed-fee pricing arrangements. 
Before selecting an award fee contract, the contracting officer should 
perform a cost benefit analysis of the expected benefits versus the added administrative 
costs. The value added to the program by using an award fee type contract must be 
greater than the costs to aclminister it. This exercise is valuable especially in light of full 
cost accounting, where the administrative cost of managing a contract is visible and 
charged to the program it supports. 
Administrative costs are calculated using the grade levels and hours 
required to monitor, evaluate, brief and implement the award fee process. Award Fee 
contracts are distinguished as follows: 
(1) Fixed-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts. Fixed-Price-Award Fee 
(FPAF) contracts consist of two parts; firstly, the firm-fixed-price part of the contract in 
which the contractor is obliged to perform at the time, place and fixed-price in the 
contract. The second part entails the award fee, which may be considered an opportunity 
for the contractor to earn an additional fee by satisfying more than the minimum 
performance requirements. 
This type of contract requires the contractor's performance to be 
periodically evaluated against a given objective or subjective award fee criteria. The 
contractor has the opportunity to earn 100 percent of the available award fee set aside for 
the period of performance. The contractor is motivated to minimize costs because under 
the FFP portion of the contract, an additional amount of profit for performance is realized 
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under the annual fee portion of the contract. Additionally the contractor may earn an 
additional fee for exceeding minimum performance standards. 
The FPAF contract is used when the Government wishes to 
motivate the contractor in managing performance areas. This contract type can be used to 
incentivize performance objectives in logistics support, timeliness and quality. Several 
agencies do not use the base fee on fixed-price award fee contracts. This is because it 
assumes that the contractor has already received the profit level built into the fixed-price. 
Small business contractors in the U.S. prefer base fees because it improves cash flow. 
2.        Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 
The next category is the cost-reimbursement contract in which the Government 
reimburses the contractor for all allowable, reasonable and allocable incurred costs of 
performing the contract. The contractor's cost accounting practices must meet commonly 
accepted standards and be open to the Government. Under cost-type contracts, the 
contractor is obliged only to provide its "best efforts." In most cases, neither performance 
nor delivery is guaranteed. Although, there are several different types of cost- 
reimbursement contracts, all have a common feature: the obligation to perform the work 
ceases when the contractor's costs of performance equal the funds provided under the 
contract. [Ref. 14] 
a.        Cost-No-Fee Contracts 
A Cost-No-Fee (CNF) contract is a cost-reimbursement contract in which 
the contractor receives no fee. This type of contract is appropriate for Research and 
Development (R&D) work, particularly with educational institutions or non-profit 
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institutions, and for facilities contracts. [Ref. 20] To use this contract type the contracting 
parties should agree on target cost. Appendix B describes the CNF with an example. 
b. Cost-Sharing Contracts 
This type of contract provides for the Government to pay only a portion of 
allowable cost as mutually agreed by the contracting parties. The contractor absorbs a 
portion of the cost with expectations of gaining benefits outside of the instant contract. 
The Government and the contractor agree on an estimated cost. This type of contract is 
utilized for R&D with either profit or non-profit organizations and contractors. 
c. Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contracts 
A Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee contract (CPFF) contract, one of the simplest 
types, entails the contractor and the Government agreeing on the allowable cost of 
contract performance and a fixed fee (profit) that the contractor receives for doing the 
work. The contractor receives the same fee, regardless of whether the contractor's actual 
costs are greater or lesser than the estimated cost. [Ref. 14]. This type of contract offers 
minimum incentive for the contractor to control costs. 
A CPFF contract is chosen when the Government cannot get a more 
favorable arrangement or when the presence of great uncertainty and risk would result in 
the inclusion of a large contingency in a firm-fixed-price contract. This contract type is 
also appropriate in circumstances where the technical and schedule risks are so high that 
the cost risk is too large for the contractor to assume. The CPFF is designed for use in 
research or preliminary exploratory development when uncertainty of performance is 
very high. Figure 9 in Appendix B exhibits this contract type. 
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d.        Cost-Plus-a-Percentage-of-Cost Contracts 
The Cost-Plus-a-Percentage-of-Cost (CPPC) contract provides the 
contractor with a reimbursement for cost incurred, plus a fixed percentage of those costs 
as profit. Since the contractor's profit is in direct proportion to the cost incurred, there is a 
positive incentive for the contractor to drive up the cost. 
The U.S. Federal law prohibits the use of CPPC contracts in U.S. 
procurements because the contractor can continuously increase costs in order to receive 
more profit. Figure 10 in Appendix B exhibits this contract type. 
The price the Government pays is the sum of the negotiated cost and the 
final profit. The final profit is determined by comparing the final negotiated cost to target 
cost and adjusting target profit in accordance with the share ratio formula. The final price 
cannot exceed the ceiling price. 
e.        Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee Contracts 
In the Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contract, the Government and the 
contractor agree on a target cost, a target fee, and a sharing formula for determining the 
final fee. The formula accommodates an adjustment in the fee, based on any difference 
between the target cost and the total allowable cost of performing the contract. Unlike the 
fixed-price incentive contract, however, the contract sets both a minimum and maximum 
limit on the fee adjustment. [Ref. 20] The range of fee and fee adjustments is negotiated 
to give appropriate weight to basic procurement objectives. A graphic illustration of CPIF 
is demonstrated in Figure 11 of Appendix B. 
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A CPEF contract is appropriate when a given level of performance is 
desired and confidence in achieving that performance level is reasonably good but only 
when technical and cost uncertainty is excessive for the use of fixed-price incentive. This 
type of contract is utilized for development and test programs when a profit incentive is 
likely to provide motivation for more effective management. To implement this type of 
contract, the contracting parties negotiate the target cost, target fee, sharing formula, 
minimum fee and maximum fee. 
/ Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts 
A Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract provides for a base fee (which 
may be zero), reimbursement of allowable contractor costs and an award fee. The 
contractor earns a base fee that does not vary with performance with all or part of the 
award fee based on objective or subjective evaluation of the contractor's performance by 
the Government. The Government evaluates the contractor's performance in such areas 
as quality, timeliness, ingenuity, and cost-effective management. [Ref. 17] 
The Government determines the award fee unilaterally according to the 
award fee criteria stated in the contract. The Government may unilaterally adjust the 
criteria over the course of contract performance. Today, these types of contracts are the 
most commonly used vehicles by the National Aeronautic and Space Administration 
(NASA). In other agencies, award fee contracting is increasingly used when the 
procuring activity wants to incentivize contract performance. [Ref. 17] 
An Award fee can be used in conjunction with other types of contracts. 
CPAF contracts are subject to an adequate contractor accounting system and Government 
surveillance to ensure cost control. 
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The negotiated elements of this contract type are estimated cost, base fee 
and award fee and award criteria. The base fee is paid on a regular basis and not tied to 
any evaluation of service. 
g.        Award Term Contracts 
An award term is defined as an extension of the contract period for 
performance earned by the contractor for rendering excellent performance. The 
contractor has the ability to earn an extension of a contract with the Government 
depending on its continuing need for the products and services and the availability of 
funds. This type of incentive can be best described as a modified award fee, since it has 
process characteristics associated with award fee provisions. [Ref. 18] 
Instead of awarding the contractor a fee, the contractor has the opportunity 
to earn additional periods of performance. The Government appoints a team of project 
evaluators who assess the contractor's performance after every given period. The 
contractor's cumulative score may lead to an increase or reduction in the contract 
performance period. 
The Government needs to perform a cost benefit analysis to determine the 
total benefits of the award term. The study includes project performance benefits, as well 
as the costs associated with performance and administration. 
The benefits of using an award term include facilitating process 
improvements and capital investments, lowering contract prices and reducing the 
manpower intensive effort of reacquiring the services or supplies provided. Both the 
customer and the contractor benefit from award term as it rewards quality contractors. 
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Award Term contracting provides an added benefit through a successful, 
long-term contractual relationship communicating with the contractor through continuous 
and in-depth performance assessments. 
Award Term is regarded as an innovative method of providing best value 
contracts to Government customers. The concept builds on the benefits provided by 
competitive acquisitions as contractors are encouraged and, in fact, rewarded for 
continuously providing good value and making investments and improvements that they 
might not otherwise make with a shorter-term contract. Although this concept is 
relatively new, it should be given consideration when the Government develops its 
acquisition strategy. 
3. Other Types of Contracts 
The final category of contracts types includes, time-and-materials and labor-hour, 
contracts, indefinite-delivery contracts, definite-quantity contracts, indefinite-quantity 
contracts and ordering. 
a. Time-and-Materials Contracts 
Another contract type frequently used by the U.S. DoD is the time-and- 
materials (T&M) contract. Under this type of contract, the contractor negotiates a fixed 
hourly rate for direct labor. That rate includes all appropriate wages, overhead, general 
and administrative expenses, and profit. The contractor is reimbursed at the fixed rate for 
each labor hour worked on the task. Any material costs incurred in performing the work 
are reimbursed at actual cost, including, if appropriate, material handling costs. 
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The time-and-materials contract is used when it is not possible to estimate 
the extent or duration of the work, especially in cases of repair, maintenance, or overhaul 
work. [Ref. 14] 
b. Labor Hour Contracts 
A labor-hour (LH) contract is a variant of the time-and-materials contract 
type. It differs only in that the contractor does not supply materials. 
c. Definite-Quantity Contracts 
A definite-quantity contract provides for delivery of a definite quantity of specific 
products or services for a fixed period, with deliveries or performance to be scheduled at 
designated locations upon order. A definite-quantity contract may be used when it can be 
determined in advance that a definite quantity of products or services will be required 
during the contract period and the supplies or services are regularly available or will be 
available after a short lead time. [Ref. 14] 
d. Indefinite Quantity Contract 
An indefinite-quantity contract provides for an indefinite quantity, within stated 
limits, of products or services during a fixed period. The Government places orders for 
individual requirements. Quantity limits may be stated as number of units or as dollar 
values. The contract must require the Government to order and the contractor to furnish 
at least a stated minimum quantity of products or services. In addition, if ordered, the 
contractor must furnish any additional quantities, not to exceed the stated maximum. The 
contracting officer should establish a reasonable maximum quantity based on market 
research, trends on recent contracts for similar products or services, survey of potential 
users, or any other rational basis. To ensure that the contract is binding, the minimum 
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quantity must be more than a nominal quantity, but it should not exceed the amount that 
the Government is fairly certain to order. [Ref. 14] 
E.       THE USE OF INCENTIVES BY THE U.S. DoD 
In 1988, the U.S. DoD awarded 78.6% of fixed-price contracts and 19.5% of cost- 
reimbursement contracts. The remaining 1.9% was for other types of contracts. The 
fixed-price incentive contracts accounted for 16.4%; the cost-reimbursement incentive 
fee contracts were 2.6% while the award fee contracts amounted to 4.2%. In total, 
incentive and award fee contracts amounted to 23.2%. [Ref. 10] 
There was a slight decrease in the use of fixed type contracts and the incentive 
contracts in 1999. In the past eleven years, the fixed-price incentive and the cost- 
reimbursement contracts have decreased from 19% to 8.3%; while, the award fee 
contracts have increase from 4.2% to 14.4%. These data is presented in Table 2. 
Contract Type Amount Sub Total 1999 1988 
Fixed-Price $70,186,947 61.5% 78.6% 
Firm 58,356,809 51.1 54.8 
Redeterminable 379,314 0.3 0.1 
Incentive 6,067,413 5.3 16.4 
EPA 5,383,411 4.7 7.3 
Cost-Reimbursement 43,971,103 38.5 19.5 
No fee 2,626,815 2.3 2.0 
Fixed Fee 16,948,294 14.8 10.8 
Incentive Fee 3,406,467 3.0 2.6 
Award Fee 16,398,678 14.4 4.1 
Other 4,590,849 4.0 1.9 
Total Obligations $114,158,050 $114,158,050 100% 100 % 
Table 2. Breakdown of Contract Types Awarded by the U.S. DoD. 
Source: Department of Defense Contract Awards Fiscal 1999, and DoD Prime contract 
Awards, Fiscal Year 1988, United States Government 
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F.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the U.S. Federal Procurement System, generic contract 
types used by the U.S. Federal agencies and the U.S. DoD. 
The next chapter will discuss and analyze problems in the Armscor contracting 
regulations, the South African DoD and the contracting practices and policies, which 
affect contract types used by Armscor. 
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IV. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY CONTRACT TYPES AT ARMSCOR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the problems in Armscor and the South African Department 
of Defense, with regard to contracting procedures and contract types. 
B. SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS 
The South African Government makes laws that govern procurement of different 
products and services for all its agencies. These laws differ from one Service to another. 
For example, the Armscor Act mentioned in Chapter I authorizes Armscor to be the state 
procurement agency of the South African National Defense Force. The Government does 
not generate regulations for procurement, but allows every agency to write its own 
regulation; therefore, the contracts with the private sector are between the agency and the 
specific contractor. 
The biggest contracting agency is the State Tender Board that acquires products 
and services for most Government departments. The law requires Armscor to advertise 
all solicitations on the State Tender Bulletin. Since Armscor is the second biggest and 
most efficient contracting agency, the South African Police Service and the Correctional 
Services acquire some of their products and services with the help of Armscor. Ninety 
percent of contractors interviewed through this research feel that allowing each agency to 
have its own acquisition regulation complicates the tender process. They claim that they 
spend more time interpreting contract conditions than focusing on the requirement 
satisfaction. Small and medium-sized contractors share these same sentiments. This 
problem is regarded as one of the causes for reduced competition in Armscor contracts. 
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C.       ARMSCOR MANDATE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Armscor is a Government agency operating under the Ministry of Defense. It was 
created to support the activities of the South African National Defense Force as stated in 
Chapters I and H It is the primary Government project management agency in South 
Africa being internationally recognized as the project management agency. The agency's 
labor force consists of about 600 engineers, specialists, accountants and administrators. 
The law calling for the formation of the agency was created, among other reasons, to 
strengthen the South African military in the wake of eminent attacks from liberation 
movements and to act as a sanctions buster since the country was under United Nations 
sanctions. The South African Government has been seeking ways to transform the 
organization in keeping with the new changes in the Department of Defense. 
Legislation defines Armscor as the direct responsibility of the South African 
Minister of Defense, while the DoD regards the agency as its direct responsibility. 
Neither the Government nor Armscor have found a common ground on which to write 
new legislation governing the defense procurement agency. On the other hand, the 
Secretary of Defense has gone ahead and written its procurement policy with Armscor 
reporting to them.  The Armscor regulation, meanwhile, is based on the old legislation, 
which gives the agency and the DoD equal powers. (See Table 1.) Armscor policy 
documents still use a quote that was made by the Ministry of Defense spokesperson in 
1982 that said, "... Armscor as the other leg of the Ministry of Defense responsible to the 
Minister". [Italics by researcher: State Security in South Africa] This statement was 
probably true at the time Armscor was formed. Today, the former members of the 
liberation movement lead the Ministry of Defense and the Government. 
46 
The Government is looking for the best way to align the agency without loosing 
quality people currently employed by the agency. The Minister of Defense still appoints 
the agency's Chairman, CEO and Board of Directors, but decisions on procurement are 
the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. The Chief of Acquisition (COA) heads the 
Departmental Acquisition of Procurement Division of the Secretary of Defense and 
champions the procurement agency's activities. The COA operates at the same level as 
the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force receiving all the requirements and requests 
for funding from the Services through the Secretary of Defense. Once these requirements 
are approved and funding is made available it is sent to Armscor to solicit products and 
services. 
D.       QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
The researcher interviewed South African APMs and DoD personnel. As a result 
of these interviews, the following problems relating to the Armscor contract types were 
discovered. 
1.        Contract Types 
The respondents were asked to select contract types that are used by Armscor 
from an attached list in Appendix B. The list included detailed descriptions of each of the 
contract types recommended by the FAR and other international contracting agencies. 
Eighty percent of the respondents said that Armscor uses the firm-fixed-price, 
fixed-price with economic price adjustment, time and material, labor hour, fixed- price 
incentive and cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. Interesting enough, twenty percent of the 
respondents were either not sure of contract types or said that the agency uses 
predominantly cost-type contracts. From this it is evident that Armscor uses more 
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contract types than those written in the Armscor contract regulations described in the 
study. Ninety-five percent of the respondents were the Armscor Programme Managers, 2 
percent were Armscor Senior management and 3 percent were from the South African 
Department of Defense. 
2. Number of Contracts 
The respondents were asked to state the total number of contracts placed by 
Armscor annually. They were also asked to distribute these numbers according to the 
contract types they could recognize. 
None of the respondents answered this question. The reason for no-response is 
that the Armscor database for awarded contracts is not available to the public and does 
address contract types. 
3. Interpretation of the Regulation 
The respondents were asked if they could identify some Armscor regulations, 
laws, policies or guidelines that address contract type selection. 
Fifty percent of the respondents were positive about this question but could not 
state the name of the regulation addressing contract type. Twenty-five percent did not 
know such regulations, while the rest said no such regulation exists. This issue prompted 
the researcher to conduct further interviews with the APMs because of the even- 
percentage distribution. The respondents were questioned on issues relating to the eleven 
contract type selection factors. The interview responses can be summarized as follows: 
a.        Price Competition 
Armscor has not been successful in introducing competition in its 
traditional sole source contracts. As a result, some sole source contractors are so 
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confident with the Armscor business that they are not applying better cost-saving 
methods of delivering products and services. This point was eminent in interviews with 
most of the APMs. These APMs should encourage and incentivize these contractors to 
look for better low risk methods of delivering products and services. Introducing 
competition will reduce contracting risk and the burden of contractors depending on the 
agency. 
b. Price Analysis 
The results of interviews have indicated that the Armscor contracting 
regulation does not give enough guidance for conducting price analysis. In most cases it 
is enough for contractors to submit invoices from their sub-contractors as proof of 
purchase price; however, no further details are requested to prove allowability of these 
costs. Allowability is defined in Appendix D of this research. The agency mainly 
considers reasonableness as a risk mitigation factor, but does not require the contractors 
to certify the submitted invoices showing how incurred costs are allocated. By 
introducing the conditions for acceptable cost or pricing data, the agency will benefit by 
contacting on low contract risk and the ability to accurately estimate the contract costs. 
c. Cost Analysis 
The responses to interviews verified that even though the agency's 
regulations do not address cost analysis in detail, most APMs consider this factor when 
contracting especially with sole source contractors and for complex projects. The results 
of this are the decision to contract on a fixed-price basis subject to a price adjustment 
formula. As a result of the above analysis, the APMs are not sufficiently equipped with 
guidelines on contract types other than fixed-price type. Cost analysis is a function of 
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more accurate cost estimates that provide the offerer and the Government with the basis 
for negotiating a contract-pricing arrangement in the absence of price competition. Cost 
analysis involves the evaluation of the offerer's cost and pricing data. These data are 
analyzed to determine allowability and allocability of costs and the basis of cost 
estimates. According to some APMs, Armscor determines reasonableness by evaluating 
invoices for material ordered from subcontractors. The problem with this process is that it 
is difficult to determine whether contractors are overcharging the Government. There is 
also another possibility that some contractors may collude with subcontractors by 
submitting high invoices. Armscor should develop a policy on allowable cost, which 
addresses the above problems. An allowable cost is any cost that can be included in 
prices, cost-reimbursements, or a settlement under the contract to which it is allocable; 
i.e., a cost tested for reasonableness, allocability and consonance with expected price 
computation principles. 
d.        Urgency of the Requirement 
The APMs claim that the S.A. DoD projecting process is affected by many 
delays. These delays cause requirements to be urgent. Urgent requirements result in the 
agency being required to incentivize contractors to deliver early. The early delivery is 
required to meet urgent requirements allowing Armscor to award contracts on all 
budgeted funds in time. Armscor incentivizes contractors by allowing higher profit 
margin. Contractors are also allowed to claim higher cost than normal for material and 
services bought from their subcontractors. Armscor has no direct authority to rush the 
DoD process regarding the requirements. It only gives consultative assistance. The 
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agency should add contract types in its regulations as a process of reducing contract risk 
caused by delayed requirements and/or delayed project funding. 
e.        Adequacy of the Contractor's Accounting System 
Armscor requires all its offerers to be accredited before they can be 
considered for contract award. The accreditation process is used to ascertain the 
contractor's financial health. This process can be directly linked with risk mitigation that 
is mainly addressed by allowing appropriate contract types and financing. Conditions for 
these vehicles are already available at Armscor. The only limitation is that the agency 
does not address contract types in its regulations. If Armscor regulations addressed the 
contract types in detail, it would be able to apply contract types other than the fixed-price 
type. Cost-reimbursement type contracts could require each offerer to submit certified 
cost or pricing data. 
/ Concurrent Contracts 
The APMs do assess if the offerer holds other Government and/or 
commercial contracts and the potential impact these contracts may have on the proposed 
contract. Armscor does not offer sufficient guidelines for the APMs to use the results of 
this assessment. As a consequence contractors take additional contracts and rely on 
temporary workers and subcontracts. When they default it becomes their problem since 
they are contracted on firm-fixed-price basis. The APMs have the expertise to 
acknowledge contractor's risks, but not all of them use it due to a lack of implementation 
guidelines. 
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g.        Extent and Nature of Proposed Subcontracting 
The law in South Africa mandates Government agencies to incentivize 
contractors who subcontract to small and disadvantaged businesses. The Government 
incentivizes prime contractors by allowing them some additional points during the 
evaluation process giving them higher chances of attaining the contracts. 
h.        Impact of Contract Types 
Recognizing that there could be no regulation on contract type, the 
respondents were asked if this would impact the agency's ability to contract fairly with 
the local defense industrial base and international contractors. 
Sixty percent of the respondents agreed that the absence of any language 
in the regulation concerning contract type in Armscor contracts could lead to an increase 
in contract risks for contracting parties. The rest of the respondents claimed that they 
were happy with the status quo of the Armscor regulations. They stated that minimal 
rules allow them to contract in a flexible manner. In response the researcher would argue 
that there are no rules regarding contract types. If an issue is of concern it has to be 
addressed. The amount of deliberation of the issue is another question. First the agency 
needs to set directions on contract types, but allow sufficient flexibility for APMs to 
tailor the contract to meet their unique needs. 
L Cost Accounting System 
Cost-reimbursement type contracts require contractors to have an adequate 
cost accounting system. It is for this reason that respondents were asked to state if 
contractors have adequate cost accounting systems and can prepare cost and pricing data. 
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Furthermore, they were asked whether Armscor has the ability to audit contractor cost 
accounting systems. 
All respondents stated that major defense contractors have adequate 
accounting systems that the Armscor regulation allows the requirements of cost and 
pricing data, and that Armscor has an internal audit division that addresses this issue. The 
shortfall on this issue is that the audit division consists of less than ten people who work 
with over 400 APMs on thousands of contracts placed annually. These auditors can only 
be fire fighting, as they cannot be actively involved on projects that appear to run without 
problems. The researcher argues that auditors are needed to be part of the project teams 
from the onset not when problems are experienced. Armscor has a strong presence of 
administrating officers who work hand in glove with the APMs. The main responsibility 
of the Armscor administration officers is to coordinate the project finance between the 
DoD, Armscor and contractors. There is an opportunity to train the administration 
officers in taking responsibility for auditing cost and pricing data. The administration 
office can also be involved in cost analysis and project monitoring cost-type contracts. 
4.        Contract Incentive 
The term "incentive" is not used in Armscor procurement regulation but is 
mentioned in the DoD policy. Because of this, the questionnaire to Armscor gave details 
about contract types using incentives to motivate contractors in meeting the schedule, 
performance and cost, and the supply of products and services to the Government at the 
best value. 
The APMs support the idea of incentives but do not want written regulations. 
They feel that unwritten regulations give an opportunity to be flexible in contracting. 
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Interestingly enough, unwritten policies may cause contractors to be insecure and refrain 
from contracting business with the Government while unwritten guidelines and 
procedures are also subject to misinterpretation. These unwritten policies also make it 
difficult for new Armscor employees to implement and reference. This misinterpretation 
was evident in the response to the questionnaire on which types of contracts Armscor 
allows. They all gave different responses to the question at hand. 
5.        Problems with the Status Quo 
The respondents were asked if they experience problems with the way the 
agency's regulations are written, with little emphasis on contract types. They were also 
requested to justify their answers. 
Only sixty percent responded to this question and all the responses were 
defensive. The majority of respondents said that there may be some problems with the 
agency's regulation, but are not sure if they are caused by the use of firm-fixed-price 
contracts only. To some respondents this question sounded as if the researcher was 
directly challenging the way they do things. As a result, the APMs felt that they were not 
ready to criticize their own system. 
E.        PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FIXED-PRICE TYPE CONTRACTS 
As  explained in Chapter HI, in fixed-price contracts the Government and 
contractor agree on a fixed-price or a lump sum of money, for timely delivery of a given 
product or defined service in accordance with the specification. The profit or loss that the 
contractor experiences during the process to deliver the item is of no consequence to the 
Government unless it impacts performance, delivery and/or quality. The advantage to the 
contractor is the possibility of earning a higher amount of profit if actual costs are below 
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the original estimated cost. On the other hand, Armscor administration officers and audit 
controls are relaxed. Therefore, the real problem arises when the contractor cannot 
deliver as promised and its costs are above their projected / proposed price. 
The contractor then needs to strongly persuade the Armscor Programme 
Managers (AMPs) to extend the delivery date or add more funding to the project. The 
contractor writes a justification to the AMP to request an extension of delivery period or 
to add more funds. This type of contract changes from a firm-fixed-price contract to a 
type that pays for the actual cost and some agreed amount of profit. According to the 
APMs the key word at Armscor is "motivation". Motivation is interpreted as justification 
in South Africa. Armscor can amend any contract arrangement as long as the contractor 
can justify it. The APMs estimated that over seventy percent of the firm-fixed-price 
contracts are adjusted annually. 
F.        PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
As stated in Chapter II, Armscor and the biggest contractors in the defense 
industry were one entity until 1992. The S.A. DoD even today shares offices with both 
Armscor and one of the main contractors, Denel Corporation. These factors cause the 
relationship between Armscor and Denel employees to be dangerously close. It is evident 
that some contractors sometimes know about funds, for a planned project before the APM 
does. As a result, the new APM can become frustrated and powerless during contract 
negotiations with contractors who have inside information on the project. It is also 
evident that even some well-experienced APMs sometimes compromise Armscor policies 
when contracting with such contractors, since they are contracting with someone they 
know personally or with whom they may have shared offices before the separation. 
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G.  PROBLEMS WITH PROJECT FUNDING 
According to APMs, fixed-price contracts are the only appropriate contract types 
because of the way the funds are made available. Approval for project funding is 
sometimes delayed and, if made available, cannot be rolled over to the next fiscal year. 
As a result, some contractors (especially sole source) who have project budget 
information start to procure spares or manufacturing before the contract is placed in order 
to be able to meet the contract funding date. According to Armscor, any contractors 
proceeding this way do so at their own risk. These contractors contribute to Armscor 
reaching its goal of spending all the budgeted funds in the specific fiscal year, while 
risking the loss of their investments in projects not actually contracted. 
H.       CONTRACTOR INCENTIVES 
The researcher could not identify any incentive arrangement that Armscor has 
with the contractor except for paying a higher profit premium to encourage contractors to 
deliver earlier than the contract time. For example, Armscor sometimes offers advance 
payment to encourage contractors to deliver early to help the agency meets its budget 
obligation of spending the project funds before the end of the fiscal year or cover for 
those contractors who may be delayed. The delays are sometimes caused by the late 
Armscor and DoD contract approval process. Advance payment helps contractors to have 
enough cash flow availability to meet their obligations. 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed and analyzed problems in the Armscor regulations, the 
South African DoD, the South African defense related industries and military acquisition, 
which is influenced by contract types presently used in the agency. 
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The next chapter provides the conclusions and recommendations; additionally it 
summarizes all research questions and identifies areas of further research. 
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V.  ARMSCOR MODEL STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT TYPES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and describes the model structure of contract types that can 
be applicable to Armscor. 
B. THE CONTRACT TYPE MODEL 
The study proposes a contract type model that is presented in Table 3. This model 
structure addresses all categories of goods and services that are procured by Armscor and 
suggests appropriate contract types. This model can serve as a discussion element for 
Armscor. 
The model addresses the following categories of goods and services that are 
procured by Armscor: 
1. Commercial Items 
The model recommends the use of firm-fixed-price contracts for acquiring 
commercial products. 
2. Production 
Firm-Fixed-Price contracts and fixed-price contracts that are subject to escalation 
formula are recommended for mature production products. 
Fixed-Price-Incentive with Successive Targets contract is appropriate for early 
production of major weapon systems, while the Fixed-Price-Incentive with Firm Target 
contract is appropriate for acquiring major weapon systems based on a prototype. Fixed- 
Price-Incentive contracts require contracting parties to negotiate the FPI element that 
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helps provide a fair and reasonable incentive and ceiling. Under an appropriate incentive 
range, contractors will strive to improve their costs during the production process. 
3.        Research and Development Programs 
This model distinguishes types of contracts for R&D effort depending on the type 
of contractor and recommends the appropriate contract as follows: 
First, for R&D efforts with a non-profit organization, such as universities and 
Armscor facilities, a Cost-No-Fee (CNF) is recommended. 
Second, for R&D with profit organizations the model recommends cost- 
reimbursement contract types, such as CPFF, CPIF and CPAF. In particularly CPFF 
contracts are suitable for preliminary exploration study and CPIF contracts cover 
advanced development and tests where profit incentive is likely to provide motivation for 
more effective management. Finally, CPAF contracts are recommended for prototype 
development. 
Third, the model recommends FP-LOE contract for R&D when Armscor wants 
the contractor to devote resources as effective as possible. The FP-LOE contract requires 
the contractor to perform its "best effort". The delivered product or service for a FP-LOE 
is usually a study report. 
Lastly,   for   low   value   R&D   the   Fixed-Price   with   Retroactive   Price 
Redetermination contract is recommended. 
4. Service Contracts 
The award term contract is the most appropriate for awarding incentives for 
innovative contractors who provide excellent service and reduce cost to the Government. 
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The FPAF contract is applicable when the contracting parties cannot determine objective 
evaluation factors and, therefore, must base performance incentives on subjective factors. 
Appropriate subjective factors such as quality, timeliness and cost effectiveness may be 
considered for this situation. The CPAF contract may be used when the Government 
needs to reward contractors for good management or when there is a need for long-term 
relations with a contractor. The Government should have a pool of fees set aside for 
award fee contracts. Award term contracts are for Government services extending over a 
long period of time. This contract type incentivizes the contractor to improve quality, 
timeliness, cost effectiveness and management efficiency. 
C.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented and described the proposed model structure of contract 
types that may be applicable to Armscor. 
The next chapter provides the conclusions and recommendations; additionally it 




Product & Services where 
there is a serious doubt of 
stability of the market and 
labor. 
Long Term contract for long 
lead spare parts 
Low value R&D (R 100,000 
or less) and for low rate initial 
production 
R&D Investigative study in a 
specific area 
R&D with non-profit 
educational institution and 
Armscor Facilities     
R&D with either non-profit or 
profit organization 
Description 
Products with well defined 
specification and SOW 
Contract in which its impossible to 
determine labor and material prices 
for the whole contract period. 
Can arrive at a fair and reasonable 
price for the first period but cannot 
determine the cost for the whole 
period. 
Where contracting parties can agree 
on a ceiling price and upon 
completion negotiate a final price. 
Where "best effort" is required. 
The deliverable is a study report. 
Contract for the use of university and 
Armscor facilities 
Preliminary study where level 
of effort is unknown  
Major weapon systems based 
on a prototype 
Major weapon systems 
(Low rate initial production) 
Development and test contract 
for major weapon systems 
Service contracts 
Engineering and design 
services, maintenance and 
repair contracts 
Contract where each party bears a 
portion of the cost risk. Technology 
developed under this contract is 




FPE or Armscor 
Escalation 
formula 
Contracts with vague scope and 
indefinite specifications 
Contracting parties can negotiate FPI 
element that will help provide a fair 
and reasonable incentive and ceiling. 
Uses objective formula. 
Contracts with sufficient data to 
negotiate initial targets only. 
Where profit is likely to motivate the 
contractor to keep the cost down 
For contractors who constantly 
improve on quality, timeliness, cost 
effectiveness and good management 
Where fixed labor rates and material 














Products with high 
dependence on the rate 
ofexchange 
Spare Parts with 
varying quantities per 
period 
Acquisition of low cost 
Software 
Contract to ascertain 
feasibility of a new 
alloy 
Contracts with Gerotek 
Development of a 
vehicle for the taxi 
industry 
Development and test 
Major weapon systems 
Major weapon systems 
Major weapon systems 
All Service contracts 
Contract with Telkom, 
Eskom^ etc. 
Table 3. Proposed Armscor Model Structure of Contract Types. 
Source: Developed by the Researcher. 
5
 Geroteck is an Armscor owned research facility. Eskom is the state owned Electricity Company 
while Telkom is a telecommunications company with the state owning the most shares. 
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VI.    CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present conclusions and recommendations 
derived from the research, answer primary and subsidiary research questions and suggest 
areas of further research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions are a sequence of analytically drawn findings based on the 
research conducted into Armscor regulation and specific contract types used to mitigate 
risk. The conclusions are cited first, followed by justification ofthat conclusion. 
1.        Conclusion #1 
The policy of the Republic of Smith Africa regarding Armscor needs to be 
updated to complement the new development in the DoD. 
The study shows that the Armscor policy on defense procurement is based on the 
Armscor Act of 1968. South Africa has experienced a lot of changes, which are not fully 
incorporated into this policy. One of the changes includes the formation of the defense 
Secretariat as an accounting office for the Department of Defense. The Government has 
transferred some activities, which were previously Armscor's responsibilities to the 
Secretary of Defense. The old DoD policy regards Armscor as the direct responsibility to 
the Minister of Defense and having the same status as the DoD. Armscor's regulations 
are based on this policy while the new DoD policy regards Armscor as its agency. 
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2. Conclusion #2 
Acquisition of defense systems bv Armscor is gradually changing from a mainly 
domestic focus to both international and domestic procurement. 
The research shows that South Africa was acquiring systems mainly from the 
domestic market as a result of sanctions. Today the country is acquiring the best available 
systems worldwide. Armscor has since become an international procurement agency for 
the South African Department of Defense. 
3. Conclusion #3 
The use of iust the firm-fixed-price contract and fixed-price subject to escalation 
formula does not allow Armscor to acquire systems and services effectively and 
efficiently. 
The research shows that the Armscor regulation recommends the use only of 
fixed-price contracts which makes it impossible to acquire products and services at best 
value especially when there uncertainties exist. The study shows that FFP contracts are 
applicable when there is adequate competition, the cost of performance is reasonably 
predictable and when adequate functional or detailed specifications are available. 
4. Conclusion #4 
The Armscor regulation elaborates on penalties imposed on contractors who 
under-perform. but does not address incentives for contractors who excel by introducing 
innovation or cost reduction measures into the contracting system. 
The study shows contracting on a fixed-price basis only may lead to late delivery 
of products and services. The agency penalizes contractors who deliver late but do not 
necessarily incentivize those who make an effort to deliver ahead of time. 
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5. Conclusion #5 
Armscor contracting model is very effective with regards to central acquisition of 
product and services for all branches of Service. 
According to the study, acquisition by a central body like Armscor sets the basis 
for acquisition of interchangeable products and services for the Army, Navy and Air 
Force. Introduction of new contract types will make the system more efficient by 
incentivizing contractors to reduce cost. 
6. Conclusion #6 
Armscor writes firm-fixed-price contracts, but administers them as cost- 
reimbursement contracts. 
The study shows that Armscor writes firm-fixed-price contracts even where the 
technical and schedule risks are so high that the cost risk is too large for the contractor to 
assume. As a result, the agency is forced to amend the contracts to accommodate the 
contractor risks. The cost-reimbursement contract is the most appropriate in such 
conditions. 
7. Conclusion #7 
The DoD personnel have a perception that contractors are overcharging the 
Government to cover uncertainties. 
The research acknowledges that contractors do include contingencies in their 
price proposals to cover for performance risk, thus raising the price of the contracts. 
Selecting   the   appropriate   contract   type   can   minimize   these   considerations. 
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C.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are provided as a result of this research: 
1. Recommendation    Regarding    the    Government    Regulation    on 
Procurement 
Firstly, it is recommended that the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
review the Armscor Act to accommodate the present changes and align the agency with 
other Government agencies. In introducing these changes the Government needs to 
consider the interests of all stakeholders, which include the long term and experienced 
Armscor personnel, the newly employed and all other concerned stakeholders. 
Secondly, the use of Armscor's contracting experience and success will facilitate 
the formulation of the new Government Acquisition Regulation (GAR) documents for all 
Government acquisition, primarily the State Tender Board. Every Government agency 
should acquire products and services, in accordance with the GAR while allowing 
agencies to add policies, procedures and provisions applicable to their environments. Any 
additions should follow the same organization as the GAR. A central organization should 
be appointed to oversee and update the GAR and its supplements regularly. The State 
Tender Board should pioneer the use of the GAR. Individual Government agencies can 
supplement the GAR in their environment: for examples the Defense GAR for the 
Department of Defense, Welfare GAR for the Department of Welfare and Police GAR 
for the Safety and Security Department. 
2. Recommendation   Regarding   Contracting   with   the   Government 
Agencies 
Contracts with all agencies of the Government should be written in the name of 
the Government and the Contractor. The Government should prohibit the agencies from 
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writing contracts in their names, for example the Armscor Contracts. This will help 
eliminate the misunderstanding between Armscor and the Department of Defense 
regarding the project leaders. The present Armscor regulations regard the Armscor 
Programme Manager (Project Manager) as the project leader because the contract is 
between Armscor and the Contractor. The DoD, however, recognizes its Project Officer 
as the leader since he or she is acting on behalf of the user and provides finance. 
3. Recommendation Regarding Contract Types 
It is in the best interest of Armscor to ensure that all Armscor Programme 
Managers are properly trained to select the appropriate contract type. The contract type 
model depicted in Table 3 can serve as a guiding tool to the APMs. The model 
recommends eleven additional contract types applicable to Armscor. The recommended 
contract types are Fixed-Price with Prospective Price Redetermination, Fixed-Price with 
Retroactive Price Redetermination, Fixed-Price Level of Effort, Cost-No-Fee, Cost- 
Sharing, Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee, Fixed-Price-Incentive with Firm Target, Fixed-Price- 
Incentive with Successive Targets, Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee, Award-Term, and Time and 
Material Contracts. 
The agency should also incorporate the definitions of concepts and terms 
described in Appendix C. These changes will reduce the contractors' risk and allow 
Armscor to contract on best value. 
4. Recommendation Regarding Incentives in Contracting 
The study shows the use of firm-fixed-price contracts for acquiring complex 
systems does not incentivize contractors to reduce cost.   Contracting on a fixed-price 
basis encourages contractors to continuously increase the contract price to cover their 
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performance risk. The study could not identify mechanisms used by the agency to 
encourage contractors to reduce cost. It is recommended that incentives be structured into 
contract types that motivate contractors to control costs. 
5. Recommendation Regarding no Adjustment to Price of Firm-Fixed- 
Price Contract 
The research shows the agency adjusts contract prices for firm-fixed-price 
contracts to provide the contractor with a reimbursement for cost incurred plus a fixed 
percentage of those costs as profit. Such an arrangement leads to the contractor's profit to 
be directly proportional to the cost incurred, which leads to the positive incentive for the 
contractor to drive up the cost. The contract type used in such a case is the cost-plus-a- 
percentage of cost, which is prohibited by the U.S. Federal law in U.S. procurements 
because the contractor can continuously increase costs in order to receive more profit. It 
is recommended that firm-fixed-price contracts not be adjusted for cost increases. 
6. Recommendation Regarding Cost and Pricing Data 
The research shows that it is important to conduct both price and cost analysis 
when utilizing cost-reimbursement contracts. The Armscor regulations should provide for 
the submission of detailed certified cost and pricing data and outline the specific 
circumstances when these data should be required or waived. 
7. Recommendation Regarding Training 
The study shows the Armscor allow amendment of firm-fixed-price contracts to 
address uncertainties.  The contract treatment in Appendix C defines firm-fixed-price as 
an agreement to pay a price for delivery of specific products and services. The Armscor 
Programme Managers should receive training on contract risk management techniques, 
incentive arrangements and contract type selection factors. Furthermore, the agency's 
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administration  officers  should be trained to  monitor contracts, which use  cost- 
reimbursement arrangements. 
8.        Recommendation Regarding Armscor Relations with Contractors 
The study shows that the relationship between Armscor and its sole source 
contractors is dangerously close. Such a relationship limits the opportunity for open 
competition and may create the perception of corruption and favoritism. The researcher 
recommends Armscor develop an arms length relationship between the corporation and 
its contractors. 
D.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Answers to the research questions posed in Chapter I are provided below: 
1.        Primary Research Question 
What are the critical issues and problems involved in the contracts used by 
Armscor and how misht the contracting process be enhanced through a broader use of 
contract types? 
The five critical issues and problems involved in the Armscor contracting process 
are mentioned below: 
First, the Armscor contract regulations are not all encompassing which leads to 
varying interpretations by the Armscor Programme Managers and contractors. The South 
African Government needs to review the legislation on Armscor and incorporate changes 
that have affected the country and the world with regards to contracting. The 
responsibilities of the stakeholders (DoD, MoD and Armscor) should be clearly stated. 
Second, a perception exists that contractors are overcharging the Government to 
cover uncertainties. Understandably, when there is high uncertainty, firm-fixed-prices are 
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not applicable. The proposed contract type model provides guidance on appropriate 
contract type. 
Third, Armscor processes a large number of contract modifications (amendments) 
as a result of the APMs' attempt to address all issues in a specification upfront. The 
agency should involve contractors at the early stage and give them incentives to propose 
methods that reduce costs. Incentive contract types facilitate the attainment of this goal. 
Fourth, there is a limit on competition in Armscor contracts. The agency should 
train contractors on the proposed contract types, and initiate steps to reduce the cycle 
time and administration burden with the acquisition of commercial products, increasing 
competition and relying more upon commercial specifications and standards. Reduce the 
time and complexity on competitive acquisition of commercial products. This can be 
achieved by soliciting offers with performance specifications. 
Fifth, contractors are frequently penalized for late delivery. The reason may be 
that they cannot estimate an accurate delivery schedule because of uncertainty and they 
cannot renegotiate their contract. The agency can solve this problem by introducing the 
eleven proposed contract types followed by training the APMs, the Armscor 
administration officers and contractors on the types of contracts. 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
What is the current state of the Armscor contracting system concernins contract 
types? 
Armscor has a great deal of international experience in selling weapon systems to 
international users, but not buying internationally. As a result the Armscor procurement 
process is written based on acquiring systems and services in South Africa. It should be 
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revisited to incorporate changes that encourage incorporation of best international 
practices. 
Armscor   contracting   regulations   K-STD   10   and   KSTD   20   are   not   all 
encompassing. Armscor should write an all-encompassing regulation based on the new 
policy that covers all areas of contracting. 
What are the major categories of systems, goods and services that Armscor 
processes and what implications do these categories have for contract types? 
Armscor  procures   commercial   products,   services   (including   logistics   and 
maintenance), different forms of research and development, program development and 
production of systems. The agency does not have policies, procedures and guidelines in 
selection of contract types. As a result, the APMs may not always exercise sound 
judgment selecting appropriate contract types applicable to the circumstances of an 
acquisition they are contemplating. 
What are the current problems and issues that limit Armscor's procurement 
capability and the potential use of alternative contract types? 
The study shows that not all Armscor contractors have an appropriate Cost 
Accounting system that allows the agency to conduct cost estimation and analysis. The 
Armscor regulation does not address contract types, which makes it difficult for the 
contractor to negotiate and incorporate other than fixed-price type contracts. 
What types of contracts might be suitable for use by Armscor? 
The Armscor regulations should be rewritten to incorporate eleven additional 
contract types. The proposed contract types are in addition to the firm-fixed-price and the 
fixed-price with economic price adjustments that are presently in use. The appropriate 
contract types are listed Table 3. 
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What changes can be incorporated into current Armscor regulations governing 
contract types? 
The Armscor regulations should make provisions for contract types. The terms 
that are defined in the contract treatment regulation in Appendix C should be 
incorporated into the Armscor regulations. 
What model structure of contract types should Armscor utilize? 
The proposed model structure that is suitable for Armscor is presented in Table 3. 
This model can serve as guidance to writing a regulation on contract types. 
E.       SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A study should be conducted to detail conditions for the use of dual use 
technology within the South African defense industry. Such research may reduce the 
dependency of the South African defense contractors on Government or Armscor 
contracts. 
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APPENDIX A. QUESTIONNAIRE ON CONTRACT TYPES 
COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE ON CONTRACT TYPES USED BY 
ARMSCOR. 
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Mr. Peter Lebelo 
Naval Postgraduate School 
2 University Cir SGC 1268 
Monterey, CA 93943-2657 
To: Armscor / DoD 
Dear , 
Thank you for your time and effort to respond to my query. I am conducting 
research for my master's thesis, and I hope you can help me with my research. Here's a 
rundown on what I'm researching. 
My Thesis is "A study of contract types used by the Armscor" 
General Area of Proposed Thesis Research: 
This research intends to examine contract types utilized by Armscor for 
procurement of different categories product and services. Contracts have terms and 
conditions, values, parties, outcomes and environments. Contract types are used to meet 
complicated procurement requirements. 
Contract types vary according to 
1. The degree and timing of the responsibility assumed by the contractor for the 
costs of performance and 
2. The amount and nature of the profit incentive offered to the contractor for 
achieving or exceeding specified standards or goals. 
The contract types are grouped into two broad categories: fixed-price contracts 
and cost-reimbursement contracts. The specific contract types range from firm-fixed- 
price, in which the contractor has full responsibility for the performance costs and 
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resulting profit (or loss), to cost-plus-fixed-fee, in which the contractor has minimal 
responsibility for the performance costs and the negotiated fee (profit) is fixed. In 
between are the various incentive contracts, in which the contractor's responsibility for 
the performance costs and the profit or fee incentives offered are tailored to the 
uncertainties involved in contract performance. 
The benefits of the study: 
This study will provide Armscor and the South African defense industry with a 
base of understanding and interpreting contract types. The study will also encourage old 
and new contractors to participate in defense contracts. The latter will assist the 
contracting agency to acquire competitive goods and services. 
QUESTIONS 
The following questions are intended to assist in graduate research in the 
Management field. You may answer them anonymously but honestly. 
A. In your opinion and experience with Government contracting does Armscor use the 
following types of contracts (Price Adjustment)? For which category of contract 
(R&D, Development, Production, Major Defense Acquisition, etc) 
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Contract Types and definitions Answer 
1.  Firm-Fixed-Price contracts.   (Fixed-Price Contract) 
•   A Firm-Fixed-Price contract provides for a price that is not subject to 
any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experience in 
performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor 
maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit 
or loss. It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control 
costs and perform effectively and imposes a minimum administrative 
burden upon the contracting parties. 
2.  Not fixed-price type contract subject to escalation (par 3.3 KP 0021) • 
3. Not fixed-price as a result of fluctuation in the exchange rate. 
(ArmscorKSTD-10) 
4.  Ceiling price contract. Total amount is fixed but the unit prices or 
tariffs are not fixed. (Armscor K-STD 10) 
5.  Time and Material contract. 
•   A time-and-materials contract provides for acquiring supplies or 
services on the basis of direct labor hours at specified fixed hourly 
rates  that include  wages,  overhead,  general  and  administrative 
expenses, and profit and materials at cost, including, if appropriate, 
material handling costs as part of material costs. 
6.  Labor-hour contracts. 
•    A  labor-hour  contract  is  a variation  of the time-and-materials 
contract, differing only in that the contractor does not supply 
materials. 
7.  Letter contract 
•   A letter contract is a written preliminary contractual instrument that 
authorizes   the   contractor   to   begin   immediately   manufacturing 
supplies or performing services. 
8.  Fixed-Price incentive contracts 
A fixed-price incentive contract is a fixed-price contract that 
provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price by a 
formula based on the relationship of final negotiated total cost to total 
target cost. 
9.  Fixed-Price contracts with prospective price redetermination 
•   A   fixed-price   contract   with   prospective   price   redetermination 
provides for (a) a firm-fixed-price for an initial period of contract 
deliveries or performance and (b) prospective redetermination, at a 
stated time or times during performance, of the price for subsequent 
periods of performance. 
10. Fixed-ceiling-price contracts with retroactive price redetermination. 
•   A fixed-ceiling-price contract with retroactive price redetermination 
76 
provides for (a) a fixed ceiling price, and (b) retroactive price 
redetermination within the ceiling after completion of the contract. 
11. Cost-sharing contracts. 
• A cost-sharing contract is a cost-reimbursement contract in which the 
contractor receives no fee and is reimbursed only for an agreed-upon 
portion of its allowable costs.  
12. Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts. 
• A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract 
that provides for an initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a 
formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total 
target costs.  
13. Cost-plus-award-fee contracts. 
• A cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that 
provides for a fee consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be 
zero) fixed at inception of the contract and (b) an award amount, 
based upon a judgmental evaluation by the Government, sufficient to 
provide motivation for excellence in contract performance.  
14. Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. 
•   A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that 
provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed 
at the inception of the contract. 
15. What other types of contracts are used at Armscor? 
B. How many contracts does Armscor place per year? 
C. Of all contracts placed by Armscor per year how many of them are fixed, not fixed 
etc? Or what percentage of them are fixed or not fixed? 
D. Does Armscor have regulations, laws guidelines and policies with regards to contract 
types selection? 
E. What is the impact of contract types to the defense industrial base and potential 
contractors? 
F. Does the Armscor Procurement Policy with regards to contract types impact its ability 
to buy and sell goods internationally? 
G. How do the Armscor Programme Managers determine the adequacy of contractor 
cost estimates and cost accounting system? 
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H. Does Armscor have the ability to audit contractor cost accounting systems? 
(How does Armscor detect overruns and underuns on projects) 
I.   What vehicle does Armscor use to offer incentives for contractor performance? 
J.   What factors do the Armscor Programme Managers consider when selecting contract 
types? 
K. Does Armscor distinguish between selecting contract types based the type of project 
e.g. R& D, Production, Service contracts, Major system acquisition, commercial 
products etc? 
L. Does Armscor experience problems in the way contracts are selected? (Do you think 







APPENDIX B. ILLUSTRATION OF CONTRACT TYPES 
ILLUSTRATION OF CONTRACT TYPES 
1. Firm-Fixed-Price Contract 
The Government agency and Bontle Catering Company agree on a price of R100, 
0006 to supply lunches for its employees, based upon the anticipated costs of R90, 000. It 
is unlikely that Bontle's actual costs will amount to exactly R100, 000. If Bontle spends 
less, its profit will increase. If Bontle spends more than R90, 000, its profit will be 
reduced. Figure 5 below illustrates the FFP contract with a contract price of R100, 000. 
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Figure 5.        Firm-Fixed-Price Contract. 
Source: Developed by the researcher. 
6
 A Rand (R) is the South African currency unit, Rl= 100 cents. 
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2.        Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment Contract 
The agency places a contract with Rooivalk (Pty) Ltd for the development of a 
fighter helicopter. The agency realizes that Rooivalk will ask for a very high price due to 
a possible increase in the labor prices and material. Furthermore, Rooivalk anticipates 
that a very high price may cover an extraordinary increase in price of material and labor. 
The two contracting parties agree on an economic price adjustment. Figure 6 below 
illustrates the FPE contract. 
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Figure 6. Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment Contract 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
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3. Fixed-Price with Prospective Price Redetermination Contract 
The Government agency places a long-term contract with the Puso Defense 
System to deliver armored vehicles. Both parties negotiate, a reasonable price before the 
contract commences. Before the year ends, the parties agree on a price of R200, 000 per 
vehicle for the first year. At a later time in the first year the two contracting parties agree 
on a price of Rl 85, 000 for the second year. The process would continue till the final year 
is priced. This approach takes advantage of the learning curve. 
4. Fixed-Ceiling-Price with Retroactive Price Redetermination Contract 
The Agency and Rooivalk (Pty) Ltd initially agree on a contract not to exceed a 
ceiling price of R 200,000. At the end of the contract the two parties negotiate a final 
price of Rl 80, 000. 
5. Fixed-Price Level Of Effort Contract 
The agency wants to ascertain the feasibility of a communication system for the 
South African National Defense Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Dyadic 
System is a private company, operating from the University of North and is the only 
contractor that can perform the work. The two parties negotiate a fixed-price contract 
based on the estimated hours it will take to complete the project. At the end of the period, 
Dyadic delivers a report describing its research. The agency pays the contractor based on 
the effort than the results achieved. The agency lists categories of labor and number of 
hours to ensure receipt of the proper quantity of man-hours. 
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Fixed-Price-Incentive with Firm Target Contract 
Given: 
Target Cost (TC) 
Target Profit (TP) 
Target Price 





Share Ratio 80/20 (Government/ Contracto 





50.000  f increase in cost) 
Contractor receives 20% or R 10,000 of the R 50,000 as a difference in profit: 
Target Profit R 50,000 
Contractor Share -   10.000 
Difference R 40.000 
The Government receives 80% or R 40,000 of the R 50,000 for an increase in 
price: 
Final Negotiated Price R 5 50,000 
Final Profit +     40.000 
Final Price R 590,000 
Target Price - R 550.000 
Price Increase R  40.000 
The effect of price ceiling turns the contract into a firm-fixed-price at a point 
called the "Point of Total Assumption (PTA)". The PTA is a point at which Rl more of 
the incurred cost equals Rl reduction in profit. In other words, the share ratio becomes 
0/100 (Government/Contractor). The following formula is used to calculate the PTA: The 
PTA is equal to the Ceiling Price (CP) minus the Target Price (TP) divided by the 
Government share plus the Target Cost (TC). Using the above information, the PTA can 
be presented as follows: 
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PTA= CP -TP +TC 
Govt share 
Formula 2 
PTA = 650.000 - 550,000 + R 500,000 
80% 















80/20 share ratio 
"PTA=625,000 
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Figure 7. Fixed-Price-Incentive with Firm Target Contract. 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
7.  Fixed-Price-Incentive with Successive Targets Contract 
Given: 
Initial Target Cost (ITC) R 300,000 
Initial Target Profit (ITP) 30.000 
Target Price R 330,000 
Ceiling Price (CP) 450,000 
Share Ratio 80/20 
Firm Target Profit Floor R 25,000 
Firm Target Profit 55,000 
Firm Target Cost R 300,000 
Cost/Share Ratio 80/20 
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The PTA equals the Ceiling Price (CP) minus Target Price (TP) divided by the 
Government share plus Target Cost (TC). 
Using the above information, the PTA can be calculated as follows: 
PTA = CP -TP + ITC Formula3 
Govt Share 
PTA = 450,000 - 330,000 + 300,000 
80% 
PTA = R 450,000 
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Figure 8. Fixed-Price-Incentive with Successive Targets Contract. 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
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8. Cost-No-Fee Contract 
The agency awards a R250, 000 cost contract to the Wits University. The 
University cannot spend more than R250, 000 on the effort unless the agency increases 
the limitation of liability. Wits will not receive any fee or profit. 
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Figure 9. Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract. 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
The agency awards a R500, 000 cost contract to the Pretoria University for 
environmental exploratory research. The agency pays the university for all allowable and 
allocable costs incurred in performance of the contract. In addition, the Government 
agrees to pay the contractor a fixed fee of R8, 000 above the cost as a fee (profit) for 
doing work. 
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10.      Cost-Plus-A-Percentage-of-Cost Contract 
The agency contract on the basis of cost-reimbursement for performance, plus an 
additional fixed percentage of costs as profit. The graph below shows that profit is in 
direct proportion with costs. This type of contract should never be used, as there is no 
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Figure 10.       Cost-Plus-A-Percentage-Of-Cost Contract. 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee Contract 
A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides 
for an initially negotiated fee to be later adjusted by a formula based on the relationship 
of total allowable costs to total target costs. In the example below the Government 
contractor's share ratio operates between R700,000 and Rl,500,000. The range is, 
therefore, called the range of incentive effectiveness. Outside the range the contractor 
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receives either the maximum or the minimum fee. At these points the contract becomes a 
CPFF at either end of the fee spectrum. 
1600 i 
1" 1400 - "A "NI 
c 
£  1200 - 
f  1000 - 
Max Fee            N. 
0. 
"$    800 - 
o 
u. 
w    600- 5 
g    400 - 
Min Fee 




i           i—  i                 i                 i           i 
D          2000      4000       6000       8000      10000     12000 
Contractor Cost (Rands) 
14000     16000 18000 
Figure 11.       Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee Contract. 
Source: Developed by the researcher. 
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APPENDIX C. CONTRACT TREATMENT REGULATION 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CONTRACT 
TREATMENT REGULATION 
A.       General 
Proposed terms required for amending the Armscor regulation. 
This section defines terms commonly used in the contracting regulation. 
1. Actual cost means the amount determined on the basis of costs incurred, 
as distinguished from forecasted costs. 
2. Allocable cost means a cost that is assignedable or chargeable to one or 
more cost objective in accordance with the relative benefits received or 
other equitable relationship. 
3. An allowable cost means any cost which can be included in prices, cost- 
reimbursements, or settlements under the contract to which it is allocable. 
It is a cost that is tested for reasonableness, allocability and consonance 
with expected price computation principles. 
4. Audit means a review and evaluation of the contractor or subcontractor's 
proposal by any or all audit personnel. 
5. A Contract means a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the 
contractor to furnish the supplies or services (including construction) and 
Government to pay for them. There are five conditions of having a valid 
contract: 
a. There should be an offer and an acceptance. 
b. It should be within the law. 
c. Contracting parties should be competent and have mutual understanding. 
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d. There should be considerations. 
e. Government contracts should be in written form. 
6. Contracting means purchasing, leasing or otherwise obtaining products or 
services from non-Government sources. Contracting includes description 
(but not determination) of products and services required, selection and 
solicitation of sources, contract preparation and award, and all contract 
administration. Contracting excludes making grants or corporate 
agreements. 
7. Contracting Officer means a person with the authority to enter into, 
administer, or terminate contracts and make related determinations and 
findings. 
8. Contract Office means an office that awards or executes a contract for 
products and services and/or performs post award functions. 
9. Contract type refers to a specific price arrangement employed for the 
performance of work under contracts. Specific pricing arrangements 
include fixed-price contracts, and cost-reimbursement contracts. 
10. Contract, Fixed-Price provides for a firm-price to the Government, or in 
appropriate cases, and adjustable price. Examples of fixed price contracts 
include firm-fixed-price and fixed-price incentive firm contracts. A fixed- 
price contract is usually awarded to the responsible and responsive 
contractor. The force of competition ensures fair and reasonable pricing 
and protects the Government paying too much. 
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11. Contract, Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) is an agreement to pay a specified 
price for delivery of specific products and services. 
12. Contract, Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment (FPE) is a 
contract that protects the Government and the contractor against wide 
fluctuations in labor or material costs when market conditions are 
unstable. 
13. Contract, Fixed-Price with Prospective Price Redetermination 
Contract (FPRP) is a contract that which allows the Government to pay a 
fixed-price for products or services, but the price is subject to revision at 
stated times during performance of the contract. At the time of 
redetermination, the contractor submits a proposal based on actual costs of 
performance and the estimated cost of any incomplete work. After a 
Government audits, the contractor negotiates a revised price, which could 
be higher or lower than the initial price but cannot exceed the ceiling 
price. 
14. Contract, Fixed-Price with Retroactive Price Redetermination 
(FPRR) is a contract that provides for a ceiling price and retroactive 
redetermination after completion of the contract. 
15. Contract, Fixed-Price Level of Effort (FFP-LOE) a contract type that 
requires the contractor to provide a specified level of effort, over a stated 
period of time, or work that can only be stated in general terms with the 
Government paying the contractor a fixed amount. 
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16. Contract, Cost-No-Fee (CNF) is a cost-reimbursement contract in which 
the contractor receives no fee. 
17. Contract, Cost-sharing (CS) provides for the Government to pay only a 
portion of allowable cost as mutually agreed by the contracting parties. 
The contractor absorbs a portion of the cost with expectations of gaining 
benefits outside of the instant contract. 
18. Contract, Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) is a contract type in which the 
contractor receives the same fee, regardless of whether the contractor's 
actual costs are greater or less than the estimated cost. 
19. Contract, Fixed-Price-Incentive with Firm Target (FPIF) allows the 
contract elements to be negotiated from the outset using target cost, target 
profit, ceiling price and sharing formula. 
20. Contract, Fixed-Price-Incentive with Successive Target is similar to a 
redetermination contract. The difference is that a fixed-price incentive 
contract contains a target cost, a target profit, a price ceiling, and a 
formula by which the Government and contractor share any differences 
between target costs and actual final costs, as negotiated. 
21. Contract, Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee Contracts (CPIF) is a more flexible 
contract type than the FPL The Government and the contractor agree on a 
target cost, a target fee, and a sharing formula for deterniining the final 
fee. The formula accommodates an adjustment in the fee, based on any 
difference between the target cost and the total allowable cost of 
performing the contract. 
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22. Contracting Officer, means a person with the authority to enter into, 
administer, and make related determinations and findings. The term 
includes certain authorized representatives of the contracting officer acting 
within the limits of their authority as delegated by the contracting officer. 
23. Cost analysis means the review and evaluation of the separate cost 
elements and proposed profit of a contractor's cost or pricing data and the 
judgmental factors applied in projecting from the data to the estimated 
costs, in order to form an opinion on the degree to which the proposed 
costs represent what the contract should cost, assuming reasonable 
economy and efficiency. 
24. Cost or pricing data means all facts as of the time of price agreement that 
prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect to affect price 
negotiations significantly. 
25. Cost-Reimbursement contract means basic category of Government 
contract in which the pricing arrangement involves the Government's 
payment of "allowable" costs incurred by the contractor. 
26. Contract Price means cost plus any fee or profit applicable to the contract 
type. 
27. Expected (Estimated) cost means the determined cost by a contracting 
officer in order to contract fixed types contracting prior to negotiation. 
28. Fair and reasonable means a price that is fair to both parties considering 
the agreed upon price conditions, promised quality and timeliness of the 
contract performance. 
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29. Model, is a simplified representation of some aspect of the real world. 
30. Price analysis means the process of examining and evaluating a proposed 
price without evaluating its separate cost elements and proposed profit. 
31. Reasonable cost means a cost that in nature and amount does not exceed 
what would be incurred by a prudent businessperson in the conduct of 
competitive business. 
32. Reimbursed cost means the final redetermined cost to be paid by the 
Government to the contractor for the contract performance on the basis of 
actual incurred costs, mostly used in cost-reimbursement contracts. 
33. Reimbursed price means the contract price that is finally determined for 
the cost-reimbursement contract types on the basis of reimbursed cost. 
34. Technical analysis means the examination and evaluation by personnel 
having specialized knowledge, skills, experience, or capability in 
engineering, science, or management of proposed quantities and kinds of 
materials, labor, processes, special tooling, facilities, and associated 
factors set forth in a proposal in order to determine and report on the need 
for and reasonableness of the proposed resources assuming reasonable 
economy and efficiency. 
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